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EI.JLA E. HARROLD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ELLS·
WORTH HARROLD, Defendant and Appellant.
[1J Husband and Wife - Oommunity and Separate PropertyProfits of Husband's Business.- Where husband is operating
a business which is his separate propel'ty, income from such
business is allocated to community or separate property in
accordance with extent to which it is allocable to husband's
efforts or his capital investment.
[2J Id.-Determination of Character of Property-Appeal.- Where
there is substantial evidence to sustain trial court's finding
that a designated sum representing husband's earnings from
business operated by him was community property, such ftnding will not be disturbed on appeal.
[3] Id.-Management and Control of Property.-When a divorce
is pending, power of husband over community property exists
" until entry of final decree.
[4J hterest-Time From Which hterest Buns.-Wife who obtained divorce on ground of extreme cruelty is not entitled to
interest on her share of community property during time
husband had management and control of such property prior
to entry of final deeree, since during that period he was not
using wife's property within meaning of Civ. Code, § 1915,
defining interest as eompensation for use, forbearance or detention of money.
[6J Divorce - Disposition of Community Property - Extreme
Cruelty.-Although Civ. Code, § 146, subd. 1, impliedly requires that more than one-half of community property be
awarded to spouse obtaining divorce on ground of extreme
cruelty, the proportion to be awarded depends on eircumstances of each case, and it cannot be said that an award of
51.13 per cent to wife obtaining divorce was improper as a
matter of law where no abuse of discretion is shown.
[8] Id.-Judgment-Final Judgment-Time for Entry.-Civ. Code,
§ 132, prohibiting entry of final divorce decree if any appeal is
taken and pending from interlocutory decree, is applicable
whether appeal is a limited one or an appeal from entire
judgment.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 22; Am.Jur., Community Property, § 33.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 58; [2] Husband and Wife, § 94; [3] Husband and Wife, § 101; [4] Interest,
118(2); [5, 8} Divorce, § 234(2); [6, 7] Divorce, § 121(1).
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[71 Id.-Judgment-Final Judgmcnt--Time for Entry. ":nlry of
finn.\ divorce decr!'!', following pll rt!n.l reversn.l of interlocutory
decree on appeal, on same day as judgment on retrial of
designated financial i~sues was proper, where more than a year
had elapsed since entry of interlocutory decree, where portion
of decree granting divorce was affirmed, and where no sufficient
reason was shown why there should be delay in entry of final
decree beyond express prohibitions of Civ. Code, § 132.

[8] ld.-Disposition of Community Property-Extreme Cruelty.When a divorce is granted on ground of extreme cruelty, trial
court has wide discretion in allowance of expenses and costs
as well as in division of community property within established
rules, and such allowance will not be disturbed in absence
of a showing of abuse of discretion.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County. Malcolm C. Glenn, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for divorce. Judgment for plaintiff with respect to
of community property, affirmed.

di~-ision

David Livingston and Louis F. DiResta for Plaintiff and
.A ppellant.

)

Devlin, Diepenbrock & Wulff and A. I. Diepenbrock for
Defendant and Appellant.
SHENK, J.-In this action for divorce a decree was entered
of date November 1, 1951, purporting to conform to the
direction of the District Court of Appeal on a former appeal
by the plaintiff from certain financial provisions of the interlocutory decree.
Plaintiff and defendant were married on November 26.
1936. They separated for the first time in the fall of 1944.
In June, 1945, they entered into a separation agreement which
purported to settle all present and future property rights
arising out of the marital relationship. In September, 1945.
they became reconciled but in March, 1948. again separated.
'rhereafter the plaintiff commenced the present action for
divorce, charging extreme cruelty. The interlocutory decre£'
was entered on February 15, 1949. By that decree the trial
court found and concluded that by reason of their reconciliation, the parties had abandoned the executory provisions
of the separation agreement. It made an award of $400 a
month for five years for the support and maintenance of the
plaintiff. It divided the community property equally between
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the parties. The plaintiff appealed from the financial provisions of the judgment and only from that portion thereof
denying- her the full relief demanded. The defendant did not
appeal. The District Court of Appeal held that in an action
for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty the nonoffending
party is entitled to· more than one-half of the community
property, citing Tipton v. Tipton, 209 Cal. 443 [288 P. 65],
and that the trial court should have considered the earnings
of the defendant accruing prior to the entry of the final decree
in determining the community estate. (Harrold v. Harrold,
100 Cal.App.2d 601 [224 P.2d 66J.) The pertinent portions
of the judgment of the District Court of Appeal are on page
609 and are as follows: ". . . the interlocutory judgment is
affirmed, except . • • as to that portion relating to a division
of the community lestate, which is remanded to the trial court
with instructions to determine the division of the amount of
the community estate as indicated herein. . • ."
Before retrial the parties stipulated that the accounting
should cover a period from July 31, 1948, to three months
prior to the date of the final decree. From findings made
following the retrial the court concluded and ordered that
the final degree be entered on November 1, 1951, and that the
accounting period should terminate on August 1, 1951. It
found that during this period the sum of $89,904 accrued to
~he community; that $88,224 remained in the community
estate, and ordered that the defendant pay to the plaintiff
$45,112 as her share. By this division she was awarded
51.13 per cent of the total estate in full settlement of her
community property interest.
The plaintiff's appeal is from that part of the judgment
"which specified that the plaintiff shall have and receive
from the defendant the sum of $45,112.00." She makes ten
contentions. Six relate to the court's determination of the
amount allocable to community earnings out of the defendant's total income. These contentions will be disposed of
before consideration of the others.
The community estate is made up of the defendant's earnings from two automobile enterprises which were the defendant's separate property. Other income from these businesses was determined to be a return on the investment of his
separate capital. Numerous exhibits consisting of the defendant's books, records and income tax returns were introduced in evidence, and it is apparent that the court's findings
were based to a large extent upon these exhibits. The plain-
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ti1fs seeks to show that the defendant's earnings as contrasted
with the return from his investment in these businesses were
far greater than found by the court.'
[1] The rule of law applicable to the allocation to the
community estate under these circumstances is stated in
Huber v. Huber, 27 Ca1.2d 784. at page 792 [167 P.2d 7081
as follows: "In regard to earnings, the rule is that where the
husband is operating a business which is bis separate property, income from such business is allocated to community or
separate property in accordance with the extent to which it
is allocable to the busband's efforts or bis capital investment.
(Estate of Gold, 170 Cal. 621 [151 P. 12]; Witaschek v.
Witaschek, 56 Cal.App.2d 277 [132 P.2d 600]; 3 Cal.Jur.
10-Yr.Supp., Community Property, § 46.)"
During the accounting period the defendant received from
one of his enterprises, the Northern Motor Company, a salary
of $1,000 per month for a period of nine months, after which
the company ceased doing business and was dissolved. The
defendant received from his other business, the Ellsworth
Harrold Company, a salary of $2,000 a month until June 15,
1950, and thereafter until the end of the accounting period
$2,200 a month. In addition be received a bonus of $11,374
for 1950 and $1.430 for attendance at various corporate directors' meetings. These earnings totaled $89,904, all of
which the court found to be community property.
The profits of the Ellsworth Harrold Company varied from
approximately $100.000 to $135,000 during the accounting
period. It produced practically all of the defendant's income
other than his community earnings. There is substantial
evidence to the effect that the company owes its prosperity in
a large part to a Ford dealer's franchise; that this business
is staffed with competent administrative personnel; that the
defendant does not take an active part in its routine operations; that he frequently absents himself on personal matters,
and that he is primarily concerned with policy matters in the
operation of the business. The defendant is virtually the
sole owner of the company, and is in a position where he can
allocate a greater salary to himself if he chooses to do so.
The plaintiff contends that "the court cannot accept as conclusive the arbitrary determination by Harrold as to the
amount of his salary." She urges the consideration of evidence at variance with that above indicated. [a] But it is
sufficient if the trial court has duly considered the divergent
factual situations and has been impressed by the evidence
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more favorable to the defendant. This evidence is substantial
and the finding based thereon that $89,904 is allocable to personal earnings by virtue of the defendant's efforts should not
be disturbed on appeal. (Estate of Bristol, 23 Ca1.2d 221
[143 P.2d 689] ; Crawford v. Southern Pac. Co., 3 Ca1.2d 427
[45 P.2d 183].)
On the prior appeal the District Court of Appeal held
that the defendant's salaries fairly represented his contribution to income of his businesses. It stated at pages 607 and
608: "\V e are convinced from our examination of the record
that the trial court conscientiously endeavored to follow the
rule as enunciated in the Huber case and to make an equitable
allocation of personal income and community earnings as was
warranted under the particular facts and circumstances disclosed in the present case." The quoted language served as a
guide t~ the trial court in the present proceedings. The
allocation to average annual community earnings, including
bonuses, during the preseut accounting period is greater than
in the prior proceedings, although the overall average income
of the defendant's businesses had decreased. In these circumstances, the above quoted language is equally applicable to this
appeal.
The plaintiff's seventh contention is that she is entitled to
interest on her share of the community property accumulating
during the accounting period. By this contention she does
not seek to recover her share of interest earned from an investment of community property. (See Civ. Code, §§ 164.
687.) It does not appear that the community funds here involved were invested or earned any interest or increment.
The recovery sought is based upon the defendant's control and
use of the plaintiff's" present, existing and equal" interest in
the community property as it is accumulated. (See Civ.
Code, § 16la.) While the defendant had the community funds
in his possession he did so by virtue of the power given him
to manage and control such property for the benefit of the
community. (Civ. Code, §§ 161a. 172 and 172a.) [3] When
a divorce is pending the power of a husband over the community property exists until the entry of a final decree.
(Lord v. Hough, 43 Cal. 581; Chance v. Kobsted, 66 Cal.App.
434, 437 [226 P. 632] ; In re Cummings, 84 F.Supp. 65, 69.)
[4] Interest is defined in section 1915 of the Civil Code as
"the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for
the use, or forbearance, or detention of money." It is apparent that the defendant was not using the money of the

I

82

l4a U.2d

plaintiff within the meaning of that section and she is not entitled to interest thereon.
The plaintiff's eighth contention is that since she was
awarded the divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty she should
be awarded substantially more than one-half of the community
property under the mandate of the decision in the prior
appeal. Civil Code, section 146, provides in part: " .•• One.
If the decree is rendered on the ground of adultery, incurable
insanity or extreme cruelty, the community property shall
be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions as
the court, from all the facts of the case, and the condition
of the parties may deem just." In all other cases the community property must be divided equally between the parties.
(Civ. Code, supra, § 146, subd. Two.) It is stated in the
opinion of the court on the prior appeal, at page 608: CC The
inference derived from this code section is that the nonoffending party is entitled to more than one-half of the community
property wh~re the divorce is granted on the ground of extreme cruelty.
(Tipton V. Tipton, 209 Cal. 443 [288 P.
65] . . . . )" In support of her argument that she properly
should be awarded "substantially" more than one-half of the
community property, the plaintiff relies on a statement in
QuageZli V. Quagelli (1929), 99 Cal.App. 172, at page 176
[277 P. 1089] : " . . . in all cases the uniform rule has been
that where the decree is on the ground of extreme cruelty the
award to the unoffending spouse must be substantially greater
than that to the one who is at fault." The plaintiff asserts
that the 51.13 per cent awarded her is not "substantially
greater" than the 48.87 per cent retained by the defendant.
In Gorman v. Gorman, 134 Cal. 378 [66 P. 313], it was held
that though section 146 impliedly requires that more than
half of the community property be awarded to the innocent
party, it does not otherwise limit the discretion of the trial
court in making the award; that the portion should depend
upon the particular circumstances of each case, and that this
court would be slow to interfere with an exercise of legal discretion by the trial court. (See also Orouch v. Orouch (1944),
63 (!al.App.2d 747, 756 [147 P.2d 678].) The Quagelli case,
supra, upon which the plaintiff relies, recognizes the foregoing principle in the following language at page 176: "What
the difference should be depends upon the circumstances of
each case, aud that is a matter to be determined by the trial
court in t.he first instance. . .. " [5] It cannot be Raid as
a matter of law that the award to the plaintiff in the present
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case is not ill I'Ollll'liall('I' wilh slatillory pl'o\·isi<Olls. 1111" Ihal
an examinat ion of thc r<~eof(1 revpals an ah1\sP of d isprl'l ion
in apportiollin~ the community estaie.
The plaintiff's final contentions are that under the mandate
on the prior appeal the trial court erred in not entering a new
interlocutory decree. and in entering the final decree on
November 1. 1951. More than two years and ten months
elapsed between the interlocutory decree and the entry of
the final decree by the trial court. Section 132 of the Civil
Code states in part: "When one year has expired after the
entry of such interlocutory judgment, the court on motion of
either party, or upon its own motion, may enter the final
judgment granting the divorce .. " but if any appeal is
taken from the interlocutory judgment or motion for a new
trial made, final judgment shall not be entered until such
moti~n or appeal has been finally disposed of, nor then, if
the motion has been granted or judgment reversed."
[6] It appears that the provisions of section 132 are as
applicable whether the appeal is a limited one or an appeal
from the whole of the judgment. In Webster v. Webster, 216
Cal. 485 [14 P.2d 522], the plaintiff appealed only from that
portion of the interlocutory decree determining the property
rights of the parties. While the appeal was pending a "final
decree" of divorce was entered by the trial court. The court
held the entry to be improper and stated at page 494: "Section 132 of the Civil Code prohibits the entry of a final decree
of divorce 'if any appeal is taken [and pending] from the
interlocutory judgment.' This section has been held to preclude the entry of a final decree though the appeal be only
from that portion of the interlocutory decree determining the
property rights of the parties." (See also Cory v. Cory, 71
Cal.App.2d 309 [162 P.2d 497]; Ritter v. Ritter, 103 Cal.
App. 583 [284 P. 950]; Newell v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.
App. 343 [149 P. 998].)
" Section 132, as interpreted by the Webster and other cases,
provides that the final decree cannot be entered at certain
designated times but it does not specify when it may be
entered following a reversal on appeal. Here it was entered
on the same day as the judgment on retrial of the designated
1inancial issues. Neither section 132 nor the cases construing
it expressly prohibit the entry at that time. The question
• whether the Legislature intended by implication or other.,,n&e to delay the entry of the final judgment beyond such a
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quest.ioll r('qllir('~ nil ill\'('stigal illn into thl' purpose a.nd reasoll
for proviciillg /I. p... rind /If dl'lay h('IWI'I'Il t.hp rnt.ry flf th"
initial and thE' filial de('r!'!'" in r1ivorce. actions in this state.
The entry of an interlocutory decree prior to tht' ent.ry of
a tinal decree of divorce was tirst provided for in 1903 (Stats.
1903, pp. 75. 76) by adding sections 131 and 132 to the Civil
Code. Two years later, in Gratnrns v. Superior Court. 146
Cal. 245 [79 P. 891. 106 Am.St.Rep. 23], this court at some
length assigned reasons for the addition of the new sections.
(See also Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1 [103 P. 488, 134
Am.St.Rep.l07, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880J ; Deyoe v. Superior Court,
140 Cal. 476 [74 P. 28, 98 Am.St.Rep. 73].) It appears from
those early cases that the purpose of the 1903 legislation was
based upon a policy of the state which does not favor a hasty
dissolution of the bonds of matrimony. not from the standpoint of property considerations affected by the marriage,
but from the standpoint of past and future personal relationships. In later cases the following language appears:
" 'The provision contained in section 132 of the Civil Code.
. . . was adopted in recognition of the fact that in granting'
a divorce the court bas a variety of duties to perform affecting
the property rights of the parties and the future welfare of
those parties and their children; and it was deemed advisable
that in such cases all of those matters, as far as possible, should
be finally adjusted in connection with the granting of a divorce.'" (Webster v. Webster, supra, 216 Cal. 485, 494, quot- ,
ing from Newell v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App. 343. 345 [149
P.998].)
It is to be noted that in both the Webster and the Newell
cases a final decree was entered during the pendency of an
appeal from an interlocutory judgment, and the entry of a
final judgment at that time was prohibited by the clear language of section 132. Weare not concerned in the present
case with an appeal from the interlocutory decree as such.
That decree. insofar as it ordered the dissolution of the bonds
of matrim(>DY, was affirmed and became the law of the case.
Any question in connection therewith was and is no longer
open. including the right to the final decree as affected by
property matters. Such matters. involving items of the additional accounting period and the pro rata division of thE'
community property, were adjudicated on the sub!lequent
hearing as directed by the District Court of Appeal. Thill
appeal from that adjmlication does not in any proper !lense
constitute an appeal as contemplated by the Legislature in
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enacting section 132 such as would stay the entry of t he final
decree. since Ilone of the stated purposes of such a stay are
here applicable. (See lV ebstcr \'. lV ebster, supra, 216 Cal.
485, 494; Pereira v. Pereira. supra, 156 Cal. 1. 9; Grannis
v. Superior Oourt, supra, 146 Cal. 245. 248.)
[7] From the foregoing it is apparent that there is no
sufficient reason why the trial court should delay the entry
of the final decree beyond the express prohibitions of section
132. Furthermore there appear:> to be good reason for its
entry at the time of judgment in the accounting determina·
tion. If, as the plaintifl seeks to accomplish. the prohibitions
of section 132 are applied to the present appeal in the same
manner as to the interlocutory decree heretofore affirmed, the
final decree could not be entered until any appeal taken herefrom had been determined or the time for appeal had expired. (i)n this theory an appeal would extend the period
during which the defendant's earnings might accumulate to
the community and, even though the judgment be affirmed,
would necessitate another accounting by the trial court of
the community estate accumulating since the close of the
previous accounting period and during the time the appeal
was pending. By appealing again and again from such judgments the plaintiff might extend her marital status indefinitely
for the purpose of sharing in the earnings of the defendant.
In the present case there have been two appeals and more
than five years have elapsed sint'e the entry of the interlocutory decree. There is nothing in section 132 of the Civil
Code, nor in the cases dealing with the problem, which indicates that under the circumstances here presented a new
interlocutory decree should be entered.
4 Our attention has been directed to the decision in DeVall
!v. DeVall, 102 Cal.App.2d 53 [226 P.2d 605]. The judgment
there granted an interlocutory decree of divorce and thereafter a new trial was ordered on the defendant's motion.
;~ The second trial was limited to the consideration of a question
~involving the division of community property. At the termii, nation thereof the court signed an order to the effect that the
previous interlocutory decree remain in effect. On the same
day the court, on its own motion. granted the final decree of
. divorce, more than a year having elapsed since the entry of
the original interlocutory necree. On appeal it was held that
the entry of the final decree before the expiration of the time
,for appeal from the second judgment was improper. The
~ ~ential factual difference in the present case is that here
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there has been all affirmance of the interlocutory decree severing the marital relationship, whereas in the DeVall case
there was an interlocutory decree still appealable at the
time the final decree was entered.
The defendant's sole contention on his appeal is that he had
legitimate and substantial expenses which should have been
deducted from the total community estate before a division
was made. These expenses include alimony, court costs and
counsel fees awarded to the plaintiff, and all sorts of personal
expenses. The trial court found that the defendant was not
entitled to an offset for personal expenses since no such allowance was made to the plaintiff, and that there would be no
difference in the final result if there had been a monthly
division of the communit.y income to offset current expenses
or a single division of total community income during the
accounting period. [8] When a divorce is granted on the
ground of extreme cruelty the trial court has a wide discretion in the allowance of expenses and costs as well as in the
division of community property within established rules. It
cannot be said on the record here presented that this discretion
has been abused.
The jUdgment is affirmed.
Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur.
I agree with the holding in the majority opinion that the
trial court properly entered a final decree I)f divorce, but
am of thc opinion that in reaching this result Wd should overrule Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485, 487 [14 P.2d 522].
In the Webster case, as in the present one, the appeal was
only from the part of the interlocutory decree dividing the
community property. The majority opinion distinguishes
the Webster case on the ground that there the final decree of
divorce was entered during the pendency of an appeal from
the interlocutory decree, whereas in the present case the final
decree was entered after a judgment on retrial following an
order of the District Court of Appeal stating that "the interlocutory judgment is affirmed, except . . . as to that portion
relating to a division of the community estate . . . . " (Harrold
v. Harrold, 101 CaLApp.2d 601, 609 r224 P.2d 66].) Tllf'
majorit.y opinion stateR that this order affirmed the part of
the interlocutory decree diRsolving the marriage and holds
that an appeal from the order entered after the retrial of
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appl'al a~ will HI tty tile entry
of a ilnal decrce ullder SI'ef,ioll la2 of t.he Civil Code.
Since plaintiff's first appeal was from only that part of the
interlocutory decree dividing the community property, the
part of that decree dissolving the marriage was not before
the District Court of Appeal for review. (American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle, 39 Ca1.2d 210, 216 [246 P.2d 935J :
G. Ganahl Lbr. Co. v. Weinsveig, 168 Cal. 664, 667 [143 P.
1025] ; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 362 [125 P. 904, Ann.
Cas. 1913E 1319].) It could not, therefore, affirm that part
of the interlocutory decree, and its order reversed the only
part of that decree that was before it for review. (Ibid.;
Denman v. Smith, 14 Ca1.2d 752, 755 [97 P.2d 451].) Following that reversal and a retrial of the issues, the trial court
ordered a division of the community property. The present
appeal is again from only that part of the judgment dividing
the community property. The situation is the same as if the
part of the interlocutory decree dividing the community
property were appealed from for the first time. The fact
that there was a prior appeal, a reversal, and a partial nf;W
trial cannot avoid the prohibitory effect of section 132, if
that section was properly construed in the Webster case. '
Even if there were several appeals and parts of the inter.
loeutory decree were actually affirmed, the word "any" in
seetion 132, as interpreted in the Webster case, would prohibit
the entry of a final decree of divorce, for under that case
the final decree cannot be entered if an appeal from any part
of the interlocutory decree is pending.
The majority opinion distinguishes DeVall v. DeVall, 102
Cal.App.2d 53 [226 P.2d 605], from the present case on the
same ground it distinguishes the Webster case by saying that
in the DeVall case there was an interlocutory decree still
appealable at the time the final decree was entered, whereas
in the present case the part of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage had been affirmed on the prior appeal.
In the DeVall case a new trial on the issues relating to the
division of the community property was granted after the
entry of the interlocutory decree. At the conclusion of the
new trial it was ordered that the previous interlocutory decree remain in effect, and on the same day, but more than one
year after the entry of the original interlocutory decree, a
final decree of divorce was entered. This final decree was reversed on appeal, on the anthority of Webster v.Webster,
,.up,." j Newell v. Supe1'ior Court, 27 Cal.App. 343 [149 P.
tlil:' prop"!'! y
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:mn [162 1'.20 4971. Section
is taken from the interlocutory
judgment or motion for a new trial made. final judgment shall
not be entered until such motion or appeal has been finally
disposed of, nor then, if the motion has been granted or .1ud9ment reversed." (Italics added.) In the DeVall case the motion
for a new trial was granted, .and it was held on appeal, following the reasoning of the Webster case. that a final decree of
divorce could not be entered until one year had elapsed from
)he time of entry of the judgment on new trial. [n the present
case the interlocutory decree was reversed on appeal, but the
majority hold that a final decree of divorce can be entered
before one year has elapsed from the entry of the judgment
on retrial. This holding is irreconcilable with that in the
DeVall case, and is inconsistent with the reasoning of the
Webster case.
In my opinion the interpretation given section 132 in the
Webster case was erroneous. Since section 132 is concerned
solely with the dissolution of the marital relationship of the
parties, it should be interpreted to mean that only when an
appeal is taken from the provisions of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage is the entry of a final decree
of divorce prohibited until that appeal is finally disposed of
by affirmance or by retrial, or in case of another appeal by
affirmance thereof. Furthermore, the principal reason given
for the holding in the W. ebster case is not persuasive. In that
case it was said" 'that in granting a divorce the court has a
variety of duties to perform affecting the property rights
of the parties and the future welfare of those parties and
their children; and it was deemed advisable [by the Legislature] that in such cases all of those matters, as far as possible,
should be finally adjusted in connection with the granting
of a divorce.''' (Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485, 494 [14
P.2d 522].) There is no basis for this statement in either the
statutes or other cases of this court. Neither alimony nor
custody of children are "finally adjusted" at the time of
granting a final decree of divorce; both can be modified at
any time thereafter. (Civ. Code, §§ 138, 139.) Moreover the
trial court is not required to divide the community property or decide the problem of custody at the time of the interlocutory decree,but can determine those matters in separate
actions. (Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 10 [103 P. 488, 134
Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880]; Brown v. Brown, 170
()'Jr!l \', nory. i 1 Cal. APII,2d
132 states t/Ult "if any appl'al
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Cal. ',4 [147 P. 1168]; Elms v. Elms, 4 Ca1.2d 681,685 [52
P.2d 223. 102 A.L.R. 811].} Even if the Legislature deemed
it advisable that property rights and custody should be finally
adjusted in the divorce action, that objective is defeated by
the Webster rule. If the parties, or the court, foresee long
litigation over those matters, they may leave them to be determined later or in separate actions to avoid prolonging indefinitely the dissolution of the marriage.
The only other reason given in support of the holding in
the Webster case is that the Legislature favors the prolongation of the marriage. The Legislature, however, by the express terms of section 132 fixed the expiration of a one year
period after the entry of the interlocutory decree as the
time for the entry of the final decree of divorce in the absence
of an appeal from the trial court's determination that a
divorce should be granted. Section 132 also expresses a legislative policy favoring the restoration of the parties to the
status of single persons and enabling them to remarry after
the expiration of the one year period. As amply illustrated
by the present case, the Webster rule permits the frustration
of these policies by a litigious spouse's repeated appeals from
~e provisions of the interlocutory decree dividing the community property. In my opinion the obvious purpose of the
appeal and new trial provision of section 132 is to prevent
the dissolution of the marriage until the right thereto is finally
settled. Once it is finally determined that a divorce is proper
and the one year period has elapsed, the purpose of section
132 is fully accomplished.
The holding in the Webster case is also out of harmony
with the general rules giving finality to severable parts of
judgments not appealed from or not subject to a motion for a
new trial. If a partial appeal is taken from a judgment in
which the issues determined are severable. the parts not
appealed from become final and are beyond the scope of
review of the appellate court. (American Enterprise,' Inc.
'9. Van Winkle. supra. 39 Cal.2d 210. 216; G. Ganahl Lbr. 00.
'9. Weinsl1eig, supra, 168 Cal. 664. 667; Whalen v. Smith.
aupra, 163 Cal. 360. 362.) If the part appealed from is reversed. and a new trial is had on the issues involved therein.
the parts not appealed from are not affected. (Smith v.
Anglo-Oalifornia Trust 00., 205 Cal. 496. 505 [271 P. 8981 ;
. Ne·ill v. Five 0 Re/inin.g 00 .• 79 Cal.App.2tl 191. 194 [179
~._P.2d 818].) Similarly, a new trial may be had on the issues
;.-
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involved in a severable part of a judgment without affecting
the other parts. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 657, 662.)
Section 132 should be interpreted in the light of these general rules, and they should apply to judgments in divorce
actions, for there are no persuasive reasons for assuming that
section 132 establishes an exception to them. The reliance in
the Webster case on the use of the word .. any" in that section is oot persuasive. In the light of the purpose of section 132 and the rules governing partial appeals, it means
.. any" appeal from the part of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage. Moreover, authority for appeals from
interlocutory decrees in divorce actions is given in the same
section of the Code of Civil Procedure that grants authority
for appeals from judgments generally. (§ 963, subd. 2.) In
divorce actions, the frequent appeals from the part of the interlocutory decree dividing the community property demonstrate
that it is ordinarily severable from the part decreeing a dissolution of the marriage. (E.g., Pereira v. Pereira, supra, 156
Cal. 1, 10; Elms v. Elms, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 681, 685; Wilson v.
Wilson, 76 Cal.App.2d 119, 122 [172 P.2d 568J.) As the
majority opinion concedes, in the present case these issues
are not so interwoven or interdependent that they cannot be
considered independently of one another .
. The Webster case should be overruled and the Newell,
Cory, Ritter, and DeVall cases disapproved, and it should
be held that a final decree of divorce can be entered at any
time after the expiration of one year from the entry of the
interlocutory decree, when, as here, there is no appeal from
provisions of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage
and the issues involved in an appeal from the provisions of
the interlocutory decree dividing the property are severable
from those involved in the dissolution of the marriage.
Schauer, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-It may well be better social policy to allow
the entry of a final decree of divorce when an appeal is pending from only the provisions of the interlocutory decree dealing with property rights. But the Legislature has stated in
language too clear to be misunderstood that" if any appeal is
taken from the interlocutory judgment" the final decree may
not be entered until the appeal is finally disposed of. (Civ.
Cr"k ~ 1~2 [emphasis added].) Consistently, the section
has UL'L'll so construed and applied for over 20 years.
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(Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485 l14 P.2d !)22J, nlld ea8P.f1
following that decision.)
It seems evident that the section is capable of abuse by a
wife who may prolong the marriage status almost indefinitely
by a series of appeals, and thus continue to enjoy a share in
the husband's earnings. Justice Traynor would allow the
final decree to be entered pending an appeal from the property
parts of the interlocutory judgment, according to principles
relating generally to partial appeals. Justice Shenk would
allow that decree to be entered after an appeal has been taken
and decided, although the result of the appeal has been to
remand the cause for further proceedings. Both solutions
ignore the specific mandate of section 132; both solutions to
that extent amount to a judicially legislated repeal of the
section.
It is fun~amental that the courts should not substitute
their standards of social policy for those of the Legislature.
In the present situation, that body has clearly stated that
there shall be no final decree until the final disposition of
any appeal from the interlocutory judgment. If the social
,policy of the state should be to allow the parties to obtain a
'final judgment of divorce notwithstanding unsettled issues
as to property rights, the remedy is for the Legislature to
amend section 132 accordingly.
I would reverse the judgment insofar as it purports to
direct the entry of a final judgment of divorce.

